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PENNSYLVANIA'S CORPUS DELICTI RULE
IN CRIMINAL CONFESSION CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
A corpus delicti rule, in its most general sense, requires proof
of the occurrence of a crime without the aid of a defendant's extra-
judicial confession before the confession may be admitted as evi-
dence. The rule is a "technical" exclusionary rule of evidence1
within the law of confessions. The appearance of several homicide
"victims" after the executions of their confessed murderers con-
tributed to a recognition by the courts that people do on occasion
confess to crimes that were never committed. 2 The corpus delicti
requirement which resulted was an attempt to prevent convictions
based solely on a defendant's extra-judicial confession by requiring
some additional evidence that the crime was, in fact, committedA
Although text writers and courts debate the need for any such
rule,4 nearly every United States jurisdiction has some corpus
delecti requirement. This Comment will consider what sort of
corpus delicti rule best effectuates the purpose of the requirement
without creating an impossible burden for prosecutors and a tech-
nical trap for judges.5
Basically, any corpus rule is a formulation of the answers to
1. McCormick uses the term to refer to particular rules for excluding
relevant evidence, "'technical' in the sense that ... for long term ends they
sometimes obstruct the ascertainment of truth in the particular case." C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDRNCE § 53 (1954). These rules "assume Relevancy, and
then under special circumstances apply an extra safeguard designed to meet
special dangers." 4 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1171 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2. The premise of the reasoning ... of the great majority of the
courts in the United States is that there is a real danger of false
confessions, coerced or psychopathic. For this premise there seems
now ... substantial foundation not only in the annals of the courts
in the sense of the reported decisions thereof, but also in depend-
able reports of criminological investigations.
Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
3. The wisdom of this rule lies in the fact that no man should
be convicted of a crime, the commission of which he confesses, un-
less the State shows, by other testimony, that the confessed crime
was in fact committed by someone. The contrary would authorize
a return of conditions that existed in the days of the inquisition.
East v. State, 175 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. Crim. 1942).
4. See 7 WIGMORE § 2070.
5. [B]ecause this rule does infringe on the province of the pri-
mary finder of facts, its application should be scrutinized lest the
restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave rise to ther.
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
these questions: What additional evidence will be required? How
much of it? Is the judge or the jury to determine if the burden
has been met? At what stage in the proceedings is this determina-
tion to be made? This Comment focuses on the answers to these
questions as enunciated by the Pennsylvania courts and examines
the rule that results in relation to its actual application in Penn-
sylvania cases and in relation to the practice in other jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND
In any criminal prosecution, the state has the burden of prov-
ing the three elements of the crime: (1) the occurrence of the spe-
cified injury or loss (e.g., in homicide, a person deceased; in lar-
ceny, property missing); (2) someone's criminal agency, rather
than a natural or accidental cause, as the source of the injury; and
(3) the identity of the accused as the responsible agent.6 The first
two elements, establishing that the crime was committed, consti-
tute the corpus delicti. 7 Although in most criminal prosecutions
this division of the elements of a crime into corpus delicti and
identity is a purely conceptual distinction, in the specific area of
criminal prosecutions involving extra-judicial confessions, a body
of rules regarding the proof of corpus delicti has developed to pre-
vent convictions based solely on a defendant's confession.
Although it is questionable whether the English common law
ever developed the rule that an uncorroborated extra-judicial con-
fession would not support a conviction,8 a fairly extensive body of
case law did espouse that policy, particularly in homicide cases.
The discovery of several homicide cases where the victim outlived
his confessed murderer would seem to have provided the motiva-
tion.9 Where that policy prevailed, it was generally formulated as
a requirement of corroborating evidence specifically relating to
the corpus delicti.10
With the apparent exception of one jurisdiction,11 the rule in
the United States is that an uncorroborated extra-judicial confes-
sion is not sufficient to warrant or sustain a conviction.12 The
6. 7 WIGMORE § 2072. For a Pennsylvania case restating this rule, see
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 462, 63, 128 A. 87 (1925).
7. Although Wigmore contends that the term in its orthodox sense
signifies only the first element, loss or injury, the overwhelming number of
American jurisdictions accept the interpretation that corpus delicti includes
the element of criminal agency. 7 WIGMOBE § 2070. For cases aligning
Pennsylvania with the majority, see Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195,
191 A.2d 369 (1963); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401
(1940).
8. 7 Wzmoaoiu § 2070.
9. See R. v. Perry, 14 St. Tr. 1312 (1660); Warwickshire Case, 3 Co.
Instr. 232 (1610); 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 290 (1778).
10. See Rex v. Sykes, 8 Cr. App. R. 233 (1913); Queen v. Unkles, 8
Ir. R.C.L. 50 (1873).
11. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
12. For citations to cases in specific jurisdictions, see Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316, 1320 (1956).
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great majority of jurisdictions require, further, that the corrobo-
rating evidence relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti. 13
In practice, the rule requires that some specified quantum of in-
dependent evidence of corpus delicti be introduced before the de-
fendant's confession and, in many jurisdictions, his admissions 14
become competent evidence. In Pennsylvania, there is the addi-
tional requirement that the jury find sufficient independent evi-
dence of corpus delicti as part of a guilty verdict.' 5
Pennsylvania's corpus rule was enunciated, without authority,
by the state supreme court in Gray v. Commonwealth in 1882 in an
opinion affirming the defendant's homicide prosecution:
[A] confession is not evidence in the absence of proof of the
corpus delicti. . . [W]hen the commonwealth has given
sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to entitle the case
to go to the jury, it is competent to show a confession made
by the prisoner connecting him with the crime. Under
such circumstances, the jury should first pass upon the suf-
ficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti. If it satisfies
them beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime has been
committed, then they are at liberty to give the confession
such weight as it is entitled to.1
In a line of cases from 1882 to 1972, this rule is repeated, cited,
often quoted, essentially without variation.'7
13. Note that the corollary to this rule is that the identity of the de-
fendant as the guilty criminal agent need not be corroborated but may be
proven solely by the confession. For citations to cases in specific jurisdic-
tions, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1328 (1956). In the minority jurisdic-
tions, the additional evidence need only confirm the trustworthiness of the
confession but need not be corroborative of the elements of corpus delicti.
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954); Wood v. State, 192
Md. 643, 65 A.2d 316 (1949).
14. E.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954); People v. Cullen,
37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951); People v. Aparo, 285 App. Div. 1171, 140
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1955); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369
(1963); Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A.2d 743 (1953).
15. E.g., Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
16. Id. at 386.
17. Commonwealth v. Palmer, 448 Pa. 282, 292 A.2d 921 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 227 A.2d 900 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963); Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411
Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 409 Pa. 268, 186
A.2d 5 (1962); Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d 780 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Deyell, 399 Pa. 563, 160 A.2d 448 (1960); Commonwealth
v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346
Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d
401 (1940); Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326, 146 A. 905 (1929); Com-
monwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301 (1926); Commonwealth v.
Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 135 A. 538 (1926); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa.
49, 131 A. 657 (1926); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 128 A. 87
(1925); Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 A. 401 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 280 A.2d 826 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Butts, 204 Pa. Super. 54, 204 A.2d 481 (1964); Commonwealth v. Oister,
III. AUmnssInLITY OF CONFESSIONS
The quantum and kind of evidence required to make compe-
tent a defendant's confession or admission has, in different juris-
dictions, been enunciated as "some evidence corroborating the
truthfulness of the confession," ' "some" or "slight" corroborating
evidence independent of the confession,'9 "some independent ...
evidence of probative value, '20 independent proof which shows
"only the probability that a crime has been committed,"'2 1 "prima
facie proof" of corpus delicti,22 "sufficient evidence of corpus de-
licti to entitle the case to go to the jury, '23 and "substantial" or
"clear and convincing" independent evidence of the essential ele-
ments of the crime charged.
24
As enunciated consistently by the courts, Pennsylvania's rule
regarding admissibility involves three elements: (1) a confession
or admission 2' is not competent evidence in the absence of inde-
pendent proof of corpus delicti; 26 (2) the corpus delicti consists of
proof of injury or loss resulting from someone's criminal agency;
27
(3) in order to admit into evidence a defendant's confession, the
Commonwealth must provide sufficient independent evidence of
corpus delicti to raise a jury question on the issue.28 Since its ori-
gin in Gray v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania courts in applying
the rule have had more specifically to define the quantum of evi-
201 Pa. Super. 251, 191 A.2d 851 (1963); Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa.
Super. 160, 188 A.2d 784 (1963); Commonwealth v. Bufalini, 200 Pa. Super.
85, 186 A.2d 645 (1962); Commonwealth v. DuHadway, 175 Pa. Super. 201,
103 A.2d 489 (1954); Commonwealth v. Adams, 174 Pa. Super. 504, 102 A.2d
202 (1954); Commonwealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 98 A.2d 221
(1953); Commonwealth v. Young, 172 Pa. Super. 102, 102 A.2d 445 (1952);
Commonwealth v. Dolph, 164 Pa. Super. 415, 65 A.2d 253 (1949); Common-
wealth v. Ferguson, 162 Pa. Super. 199, 56 A.2d 360 (1948); Commonwealth
v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944); Commonwealth v. Eng
Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 28 A.2d 710 (1942); Commonwealth v. Amato,
148 Pa. Super. 151, 24 A.2d 681 (1942).
18. E.g., Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 65 A.2d 316 (1949). This re-
quirement is often referred to as a corroboration rule to distinguish it from
the requirement of evidence that tends independently to prove corpus
delicti.
19. E.g., People v. Smith, 72 Cal. App. 2d 875, 164 P.2d 857 (1946);
Nelson v. State, 50 Del. 96, 123 A.2d 859 (1956).
20. E.g., Hogan v. State, 235 Ind. 271, 132 N.E.2d 908 (1956).
21. E.g., Hays v. State, 214 Miss. 83, 58 So. 2d 61 (1952).
22. E.g., People v. Corrales, 34 Cal. 2d 426, 210 P.2d 843 (1949).
23. E.g., Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
24. E.g., Yarborough v. United States, 309 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1962).
25. Hereinafter, where the term "confession" is used in reference to
Pennsylvania's corpus delicti rule, it is to be understood that the same re-
quirements and interpretations apply to extra-judicial admissions made by
a defendant.
26. The Pennsylvania courts have consistently held, however, that ad-
mission of a confession before sufficient evidence of corpus delicti is in-
troduced is not reversible error if the deficiency is afterward repaired.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943); Common-
wealth v. Ferguson, 162 Pa. Super. 199, 56 A.2d 360 (1948).
27. See cases cited at note 17 supra.
28. See cases cited at note 17 supra.
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dence necessary to make admissible the confession, the kind of
evidence sufficiently independent of the confession to be consid-
ered, and the elements necessary to establish criminal agency.
A. Quantum of Evidence Required
It is Gray that defines the quantum of independent evidence
required to admit a defendant's confession as that sufficient "to en-
title the case to go to the jury. '2 9 That standard has been defined
as evidence which, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to
establish corpus delecti beyond a reasonable doubt.30 The logic
of this standard is implicit since the jury must ultimately deter-
mine the existence of the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt
based on the evidence presented independent of the confession.3 1
Alongside this basic formulation, however, has developed the prin-
ciple that the corpus delicti is sufficiently established where the
circumstances attending the injury are consistent with crime al-
though they may also be consistent with accident or, in the case of
homicide, with suicide,32 and that, with respect to its burden of es-
tablishing corpus delicti, the prosecution need not negative these
possibilities.A
Since the purpose of a corpus rule is to require some assurance
that a crime has actually been committed, it would seem that the
Gray requirement should act as some modification of the latter
standard at least in providing a lower limit of the "consistent wifh"
rule to prevent its becoming merely a "possibility of crime" re-
quirement.34 Instead, the latter rule alone has been applied in
some cases where the independent evidence is unquestionably
"consistent with" crime but questionably sufficient in law to meet
29. 101 Pa. 380, 386.(1882).
30. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 409 Pa. 268, 186 A.2d 5 (1962); Common-
wealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 280 A.2d 826 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 95 A.2d 221 (1953).
31. In most cases, the only evidence tending to establish the corpus
delicti will be presented by the prosecution and should be presented prior
to an offer of the confession. There is a suggestion in the opinion in Com-
monwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943) that the defendant's
testimony on his own behalf could, by its inconsistency, be considered by
the jury as further evidence tending to establish corpus delicti, but this has
not been developed in subsequent cases.
32. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d 780 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa.
128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657
(1926).
33. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926).
34. In construing circumstantial or presumptive evidence in re-
spect to the corpus delicti, we should proceed upon the theory that
the burden of convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. In Common-
wealth v. Frazier, the police found the victim dead of gunshot
wounds, found the revolver beside the body, found, from an ex-
pert's examination, that the gun had been less than an inch from
the victim's clothing when fired, and found no evidence of any
struggle. On the basis of this evidence, which had led the police to
label the victim's death a suicide, the trial court nevertheless held
the fact of a crime sufficiently established to admit the defendant's
admissions.35 In Commonwealth v. Brusky, the independent evi-
dence held sufficient to admit the defendant's confession consisted
of the testimony of the alleged larceny victim, "a very confused
man of 74 who was not sure whether he lost, mislaid or had stolen
[sic] wallets containing a large sum of money, the amount of which
he was not able to remember," and evidence of purchases made at
local stores by the defendant and of her possession of a substantial
sum of money. The evidence was introduced without proof of her
prior financial condition. 6 In Commonwealth v. Lettrich, the dis-
appearance of an infant once in the defendant's custody, coupled
with the defendant's inconsistent statements, was held sufficient
evidence of the child's murder to admit the defendant's confes-
sion.
37
This "consistent with" interpretation is impliedly rejected by
several cases which seem to require a more substantial showing
that a crime was committed. In appeals from two arson convic-
tions, expert testimony establishing no more than a possibility that
the fires were of incendiary origin was held not to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime sufficiently to admit the defendants'
confessions.38 In Commonwealth v. Gold, testimony by a store
manager that the merchandise allegedly stolen could have come
from his store and could have been stolen was held not sufficient
the defendant is presumed to be innocent. . . . When a conviction
for felony rests altogether upon circumstantial evidence, . . . 'the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.'
State v. Bowman, 294 Mo. 245, 243 S.W. 110, 117 (1922) [citations omitted].
35. 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963). But cf. People v. Rooks, 243
N.Y.S.2d 301 (1963).
36. 219 Pa. Super. 54, 55, 280 A.2d 826, 827 (1971).
37. 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943). But cf. State v. Doucette, 147
Conn. 95, 157 A.2d 487 (1959); State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010
(1938). The evidence in the Lettrich case was so minimal that the writer
of a case note on it was led to conclude:
[I] n following the lead of the Irish, Australian and New Zealand
cases on homicide under circumstances where except for a confes-
sion made extra-judicially, there was no evidence of a human crim-
inal agency, the court in the instant case reaches a sound and de-
sirable conclusion which may presage a trend of judicial opinion in
the United States upon this troublesome problem.
29 VA. L. REv. 1070, 1071 (1943) (emphasis added).
38. Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 227 A.2d 900 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 98 A.2d 221 (1953).
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proof of the corpus delicti of the crime.3 9 Of twenty-three Penn-
sylvania cases appealed on the grounds that the Commonwealth
had failed to meet its burden of proving corpus delicti,40 in only
these three41 was the evidence held insufficient.
In those cases where the courts rely on the "consistent
with" definition of the sufficiency requirement, the requirement
would appear to have been defined almost out of existence. The
"consistent with" formulation does not establish any quantum of
evidence required but merely establishes that there be "some" in-
dependent evidence and that it allow the interpretation that a
crime was committed. Although in no case does the court speak to
the point of how probable this interpretation must be, the lan-
guage of the cases certainly permits the inference that so long as
the evidence is consistent with crime, even though that interpreta-
tion is a bare possibility, a confession is admissible.42 Since the
purpose of this rule is to avoid a conviction for a crime that was
never committed, an interpretation requiring only evidence con-
sistent with crime would seem to defeat the purpose of having any
corpus rule.
B. Kind of Evidence Required
In some jurisdictions having corpus rules requiring a minimal
quantum of independent evidence, e.g., "some" or "slight" evidence,
39. 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
40. Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 227 A.2d 900 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 192 A.2d 693 (1963); Commonwealth
v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 409
Pa. 268, 186 A.2d 5 (1962); Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169 A.2d
780 (1961); Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943); Commonwealth
v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940); Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa.
326, 146 A. 905 (1929); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301
(1926); Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 135 A. 538 (1926); Common-
wealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926); Gray v. Commonwealth,
101 Pa. 380 (1882); Commonwealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 280 A.2d
826 (1971); Commonwealth v. Butts, 204 Pa. Super. 302, 204 A.2d 481
(1964); Commonwealth v. Oister, 201 Pa. Super. 251, 191 A.2d 851 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Super. 160, 188 A.2d 784 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Adams, 174 Pa. Super. 504, 102 A.2d 202 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 98 A.2d 221 (1953); Commonwealth
v. Ferguson, 162 Pa. Super. 199, 56 A.2d 360 (1948); Commonwealth v.
Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944); Commonwealth v. Eng Chuing,
150 Pa. Super. 445, 28 A.2d 710 (1942); Commonwealth v. Amato, 148 Pa.
Super. 151, 24 A.2d 681 (1942).
41. Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 227 A.2d 900 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 98 A.2d 221 (1953); Commonwealth
v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
42. Cases cited at notes 35-37 supra.
the purpose of the rule is effectuated by a very strict interpreta-
tion of what evidence is actually "independent" of the confession.
These courts very strictly distinguish between additional evidence
which merely supports the truthfulness of the confession and evi-
dence not only outside and additional to the defendant's statement
but also independently probative on the issue of corpus delicti. 43
Courts making such a distinction hold that facts merely corrobora-
tive constitute no independent evidence and meet no burden of
proof however slight.
44
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the
finding of unidentified bones in the places where the accused con-
fessed he had buried the pieces of the woman he murdered would
certainly go to the weight of the defendant's confession but consti-
tuted no probative evidence of corpus delicti.45  In People v.
Shanks, the New York court held medical testimony that the de-
cedent died of asphyxiation from gas poisoning was "no additional
proof" of corpus delicti though it corroborated the defendant's
confession that he had turned on the gas jets leaving the decedent
asleep in the apartment they shared.4  The Utah Supreme Court,
reversing a conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery, held
that the unexplained presence of two strangers in a local hotel
room where were found several loaded pistols was "not sufficient
evidence to meet the requirements as to independent proof of
corpus delicti whatever rule as to the quantum of proof is ap-
plied."
47
43. The requirement of independent evidence leads to confusion as
courts use the term to describe three different evidentiary burdens. Courts
establishing the lightest burden interpret the requirement of independent
evidence as meaning evidence merely outside and additional to the con-
fession; in these jurisdictions, additional evidence which supports the
trustworthiness of the confession is held to meet the requirement even if it
is in no way probative on the question of corpus. A second interpretation
requires that the evidence be not only additional to the confession but also
independently probative on the issue of corpus delicti. Thus, testimony
placing the defendant at the scene of a death is corroborative of the trust-
worthiness of his confession and would meet the former burden but provides
no probative evidence that the death was a homicide rather than a suicide.
Medical testimony that a fatal wound could not have been self-inflicted, in
addition to corroborating the defendant's murder confession, is independ-
ently probative on the corpus issue. See notes 45-52 and accompanying
text infra. The most stringent evidentiary burden requires that the prose-
cution provide independently probative evidence of every definitional ele-
ment of the crime without reference to the defendant's confession. This
would require that, in a prosecution for first-degree murder, the prosecu-
tion produce evidence outside the confession tending to prove not only a
homicide but also the intent specified in the definition of the crime. See
notes 54-75 and accompanying text infra.
44. See cases cited at notes 45-47 infra.
45. Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949), clarified, 228
Ind. 13, 89 N.E.2d 443 (1949).
46. 108 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509 (1951).
47. State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353, 357 (1957). See also
State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 230 P.2d 467 (1958).
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In numerous Pennsylvania cases, the required quantum of in-
dependent evidence has been held satisfied by evidence which is, in
the terms of the above cases, corroborative of the confession but
questionably probative on the issue of whether the crime was com-
mitted. The Pennsylvania courts have considered as independent
evidence of corpus delicti the defendant's ownership of a revolver
of the same caliber as that of the fatal bullet,48 the defendant's
presence in the vicinity at the time of the alleged crime,49 evi-
dence that the defendant was the last person known to have seen
the supposed victim ahve,50 the defendant's need of money,5 1 and
prior threats by the defendant on the life of someone who later
disappeared.
2
One problem inherent in the use of evidence of this nature is
that the distinction between corpus delicti and identity tends to
become blurred. In a case where a death is unquestionably a
criminal homicide, the defendant's presence in the vicinity or his
ownership of a particular caliber weapon may be probative on the
issue of the identity of the murderer; however, where corpus de-
lecti is an issue, such facts are of questionable value in determining
if there was a murder at all. Perhaps certain of these cases are
explainable on a cumulation theory. Although each fact alone is
at best corroborative of the truth of the confession, taken together,
the presence in the vicinity, at the time of the supposed victim's
disappearance, of one who had previously threatened her life
53
may be of such weight as to have become independently probative
on the issue of corpus delicti.
Any attempt to determine which interpretation best achieves
a balance between the protection of the defendant and the burden
on the prosecution, given the nature of the available evidence, re-
quires some consideration of the degree of that burden. A re-
quirement of independently probative evidence is perhaps more
justifiable where the quantum of evidence required is slight.
Where the quantum is very high, such a rule could make the prose-
cution's burden of proof nearly impossible; where corroborative
evidence is acceptable to meet a minimal burden of proof, the pur-
pose of a corpus rule may be defeated.
48. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926).
49. Id.; Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
50. Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326, 146 A. 905 (1929).
51. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926) (both homicide pro-
secutions).
52. Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
53. The facts fit those of Gray.
in those jurisdictions requiring that the additional evidence
be independently probative on the issue of corpus delicti, there is
a further split of authority on the question of whether this evi-
dence must go to every definitional element of the crime to meet
the sufficiency requirement for admitting the defendant's confes-
sion. Forte v. United States and, following it, Ercoli v. United
States represent a line of federal cases holding that the criminal
agency constituent of corpus delicti must be established by inde-
pendent evidence of each definitional element of the crime
charged."4 In Forte, the court held that, on a charge of transport-
ing a motor vehicle in interstate commerce knowing it to have
been stolen, scienter is an element of the corpus delicti and must
be proven independent of the confession." In Ercoli, the court's
statement of the elements of the corpus delicti of negligent homi-
cide was taken directly from the statutory definition of the ele-
ments of the crime. 56 In State v. Basham, an Oklahoma court
reversed the defendant's burglary conviction because the evidence
outside the defendant's confession established only that property
had been stolen but failed to establish the specific definitional ele-
ments of burglary.5 7 In State v. Zwieroski, the defendant's con-
viction for breaking and entering at night was reversed because
the night element of the crime was established only by the defen-
dant's confession."
The alternative interpretation of the corpus rule would seem
to require only that every element of the crime be established by
the independent evidence in conjunction with the confession. The
United States Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, after re-
viewing the divergent federal decisions on this question, deter-
mined the better rule to be that, although the prosecution must
introduce substantial independent evidence, it need establish in-
dependently only those elements of the offense not established by
the confession. 9
Although the latter rule has the support of the United States
Supreme Court and many American jurisdictions,60 it is questiona-
ble whether this interpretation is available to the Pennsylvania
courts since Pennsylvania's corpus rule requires that the jury
make a final determination on corpus delicti without considering
the defendant's confession. Whether, however, Pennsylvania does
make the more stringent evidentiary requirement is left in some
doubt by the body of case law. Although the requirement of inde-
54. Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Forte
v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
55. 94 F.2d at 244.
56. 131 F.2d at 357.
57. 340 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1959).
58. 368 Mich. 56, 117 N.W.2d 179 (1962).
59. 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954).
60. See cases cited at note 81 infra.
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pendent evidence has been stated as proof "that the crime charged
was committed by someone,""' it has also been stated as requiring
proof of "someone's criminality" as the source of the injury,
2
proof that the injury "resulted from a felonious act,"'68 proof, in a
homicide prosecution, that "the death was caused by a beating,
gunshot or other circumstance indicating a felonious act."
'64
Whether proof of a "felonious act" or "someone's criminality"
requires independent evidence establishing every element of the
specific crime charged is not clearly indicated in the Pennsylvania
cases. The corpus delicti of larceny has been held established by
evidence of the loss of property plus evidence of "human agency";
no mention was made of intent.6 5 The corpus delicti of receiving
stolen goods has been held established by evidence that property
identified by the owner was in the defendant's possession; no men-
tion was made of "reasonable cause" to know the goods were sto-
len.16 Evidence of a third party's illegal possession of the narcotic
has been held to establish the corpus delicti of unlawful sale of
opium.6 7 Birth of a child to an unwed mother was said to estab-
lish the corpus delicti of criminal adultery.6 s It does seem clear
that in a homicide prosecution, evidence establishing the particu-
lar grade of felonious homicide is not required; thus, in prosecu-
tions for first degree murder, the corpus delicti of the crime is es-
tablished by proof that the deceased was the victim of some de-
gree of felonious homicide; the grade of the offense can apparently
be established by the confession. 69 In Commonwealth v. Homeyer,
a prosecution for first degree murder, evidence that the severed
head of the defendant's wife was found encased in concrete in the
defendant's basement was found to be sufficient proof of corpus
delicti.
70
It is submitted that in prosecutions for homicide and certain
61. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 503, 31 A.2d 155, 157
(1943) (emphasis added).
62. Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 134, 16 A.2d 401, 404
(1940) (emphasis added).
63. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 502, 31 A.2d 155, 158
(1943); Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 238, 120 A. 401, 402 (1923)
(emphasis added).
64. Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 368, 169 A.2d 780, 785 (1961).
65. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 162 Pa. Super. 199, 56 A.2d 360 (1948).
66. Commonwealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
67. Commonwealth v. Eng Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 28 A.2d 710
(1942).
68. Commonwealth v. Dolph, 164 Pa. Super. 415, 65 A.2d 253 (1949).
69. See Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953);
Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
70. 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953).
other crimes, Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the require-
ment of independent evidence establishing the criminal agency ele-
ment of corpus delicti to mean that the prosecution must produce
evidence that someone committed a crime "something like" the
crime charged. Such a rule may be a practical necessity if the
confession cannot be relied upon to establish any element of the
crime; this is particularly true where the complete separation of
agency and identity is impossible, e.g., where the injury is not a
tangible one, as in income tax evasion,71 where the nature of the
crime makes the identity of the "someone" who committed it an
essential element, as in embezzlement;7 2 or where scienter or spe-
cific intent is a material element of the crime.7 3  It is unclear,
however, whether the mitigation of a "something like" require-
ment is the general Pennsylvania rule; is an exception to a more
strict elements rule, applicable only with respect to certain
crimes;74 or is an "exception" employed in certain cases where an
appellate court believes that the application of a stricter interpre-
tation to the particular fact situation would work an injustice.75
The Pennsylvania corpus delicti rule establishes sufficiency re-
quirements at two stages of the trial procedure: at the point where
the prosecution seeks to have admitted into evidence the defen-
dant's confession and as a first step in the jury determination as to
the defendant's guilt. With respect to the first, the kind and
quantum of independent evidence required before the defendant's
confession can be admitted has been interpreted by the Pennsyl-
vania courts as requiring something less than independently pro-
bative evidence, something less than proof of all elements of the
crime, and something less than evidence sufficient to convince a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In practice, Pennsylvania's rule
regarding admissibility seems to be very much in line with the ma-
jority of other jurisdictions which, in general, require some evi-
dence76 of probative value, additional to the confession, which re-
lates to and tends to establish corpus delicti.
71. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
72. See People v. Fronk, 133 Cal. App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (1927).
73. See Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); State v.
Basham, 340 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1959).
74. See State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947). But see
State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
75. That it is the existence of a confession that motivates such an in-
terpretation is suggested by the strict adherence by the courts in non-con-
fession cases to the requirement that the prosecution establish by some-
thing more than inference every element of the crime. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 549, 260 A.2d 751 (1970).
76. The distinction between the requirements of "some" evidence and
"substantial" evidence would appear to be purely semantic. See Forte
v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Compare Parker v.
State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949) and People v. Cuozzo, 292 N.Y. 85,
54 N.E.2d 20 (1944) with Solar v. United States, 94 A.2d 34 (D.C. Ct. App.




The second element of the Pennsylvania corpus rule, as it is
stated by the courts, imposes on the prosecution a much heavier
burden than that imposed in any other jurisdiction: to provide in-
dependently, without reference to the defendant's confession or
admissions, sufficient evidence of corpus delicti to convince the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed
7
In any case where corpus is an issue, the court is required to in-
struct the jury that it must first make a determination as to
corpus, without considering the confession, and then may consider
the confession on the question of the defendant's guilt. 8 Failure
to give this instruction in an appropriate case has been held rever-
sible error,79 and an instruction that properly states the law but
might be misunderstood by the jury with respect to what evidence
can be considered in the determination of corpus has also been
held to constitute reversible error.8 0 In every other jurisdiction
requiring independent evidence, a burden of this weight is spe-
cifically negatived; these courts holding that the independent evi-
dence need not alone establish corpus delicti but that the jury, con-
sidering the confession and the additional evidence, must find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that
the accused committed itY1
In practice, the court's determination as to admissibility of
the confession is little more than a device for eliminating cases
where the prosecution blatently fails to meet any burden of proof.
Theoretically, this has no effect on blunting Pennsylvania's very
77. Cases cited at note 17 supra. It would seem that the jury is to
consider, in making its determination as to corpus, not only the prosecu-
tion's evidence but also any contradictory evidence or inference presented
by the defense. Commonwealth v. Oister, 201 Pa. Super. 251, 191 A.2d 851
(1963) was the first case to speak specifically to this point. There, testi-
mony presented by the defense and cross-examination of the prosecution's
expert witness challenged his conclusion as to the incendiary origin of the
fire defendant stood accused of having started. The court held that the
contradictory explanations as to the criminal agency element of corpus
delicti were for the jury. 201 Pa. Super. at 256, 191 A.2d at 853. But see
Commonwealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 57, 280 A.2d 826, 828.
78. E.g., Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 A. 401 (1923);
Commonwealth v. Oister, 201 Pa. Super. 251, 191 A.2d 851 (1963).
79. Commonwealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 280 A.2d 826 (1971).
80. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 A. 401 (1923).
81. E.g., Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937); State v.
Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 320 P.2d 467 (1958); State v. Doucette, 147 Conn.
95, 157 A.2d 487 (1959); Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949);
People v. Conroy, 287 N.Y. 201, 38 N.E.2d 499 (1941); State v. Weldon, 6
Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353(1957).
strict corpus requirement since the court's determination is not
conclusive on the issue of sufficiency,82 and it is not until the jury
makes its determination that the corpus rule is actually effectu-
ated. It is contended, however, that the effectiveness of a corpus
delicti requirement at this stage of trial procedure is negligible and
any protection it affords a defendant is illusory.
First, although it is universally agreed that it is the responsi-
bility of the judge to determine what evidence the jury shall hear
and the responsibility of the jury to make determinations of fact,
situations where the competence of evidence which is unquestion-
ably relevant depends on some preliminary determination of fact
have resulted in very real procedural dilemmas. Where the fac-
tual determination coincides with an ultimate fact for the jury,
the problems created are multiplied.8 3 The traditional solution is
to require the judge to determine the preliminary fact; 4 at the
other extreme would be to require the judge to admit the evidence
unconditionally and leave the question of whether or not to con-
sider it to the jury. With respect to its corpus rule, Pennsylvania's
solution is to require a preliminary determination by the judge as
to sufficiency to admit a defendant's confession then a resubmis-
sion of the issue of sufficiency, now in terms of a factual determi-
nation, to the jury as a prerequisite to their consideration of the
confession.85 In effect, the jury is being asked to make a decision
on the admissibility of evidence. Such a practice assumes, first,
that the decision of the trial judge is not at all motivated by his
awareness that final responsibility for the determination is on
the jury.8 6 It further assumes that the preliminary determina-
tion of the judge will have no influence on the jury's later deci-
sion.817 If this assumption be unwarranted, such influence would
be particularly damaging where, as in the determination as to
corpus, the standards for these two decisions are distinctly differ-
ent. Lastly, it assumes that the jury is both willing and able to
make the kind of discriminations inherent in the enforcement of
exclusionary rules of evidence. As McCormick notes, juries are
intent mainly on reaching their verdict in this case in ac-
cord with what they believe to be true rather than in en-
forcing the long term policies of evidence law. . . [W] hen
a dispute about a preliminary conditioning fact is not re-
served for the judge but is left to the jury, the exclusion-
ary rule is likely to be disregarded.8
82. Commonwealth v. Brusky, 219 Pa. Super. 54, 280 A.2d 826 (1971).
83. See generally Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Deter-
mination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REv. 165 (1929)
[hereinafter cited as Morgan].
84. State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
85. Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882). See cases cited at
note 17 supra.
86. Morgan, supra note 83, at 176.
87. See State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911).
88. C. McComwncK, EvIEcE § 53 at 123, 125 (1954).
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The most obvious and difficult problem created by this proce-
dure is that it asks a jury, in determining whether there is suffi-
cient evidence that a crime was committed, to ignore the defendant's
confession that he commited this crime. "The naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury
• . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."8 9 In
striking down a similar New York procedure whereby the jury
was asked to make a determination as to voluntariness before con-
sidering a confession,9" Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Su-
preme Court, noted that not only may a jury be unwilling to dis-
regard evidence they find relevant, but "[i]f there are any linger-
ing doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does the
jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession?" 9'
The same point was made in Bruton v. United States with respect
to instructions to the jury to disregard a co-defendant's confession.
The Court said, regarding reliance on limiting instructions, "there
are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or can-
not follow instructions is so great . . . that the practical and hu-
man limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. '92 Mr. Jus-
tice White, dissenting to the decision with regard to a co-defen-
dant's confession, conceded that the confession of the defendant
himself is "the most probative and damning evidence that can be
admitted against him. . . . Certainly, confessions have profound
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. ' '93
Although it is not suggested that the corpus delicti issue has
the constitutional overtones of the questions dealt with in these
cases, the recognition of the problem of allowing the jury to hear
evidence admitted conditionally, the limitations of "disregard" in-
structions, and the irrevocably damning influence of a confession
are certainly applicable to the Pennsylvania procedure with re-
spect to corpus delicti. One commentator concludes that argu-
ments for departure from the orthodox rule that questions of ad-
89. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring
opinion).
90. The New York procedure for determining voluntariness required
the trial judge to make a preliminary determination; if the evidence pre-
sented a "fair question" as to the voluntariness of the confession, the con-
fession was to be admitted. The jury was then to be required to make its
own determination on voluntariness under instructions that, if it found
the confession involuntary, the confession was to be disregarded entirely.
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963).
91. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388 (1963).
92. 391U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
93. Id. at 139, 140 (dissenting opinion).
missibility be left to the court "strike at the validity of the exclu-
sionary rules themselves. '94 The suggestion is that a procedural
rule allowing the jury to decide whether or not to consider evi-
dence is, in effect, a way of getting to the jury all evidence rele-
vant to the issues while still verbally upholding the judicially
made evidence rules.
V. APPELLATE REVIEW
Although appellate courts are admirably suited to review ques-
tions of admissibility, any review of factual findings by a jury is
severely circumscribed: "Since the issue . . . was submitted to the
jury with appropriate instructions we would normally be pre-
cluded from reviewing or disturbing the inferences of fact drawn
from the evidence by the jury."95  One effect of Pennsylvania's
rule making the final determination of corpus delicti a question
of fact for the jury rather than a question of admissibility for the
court would seem to be the concommitant limitation on appellate
review. Where there is any relevant evidence to support a jury's
guilty verdict, an appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evi-
dence confronts the appellate court's unwillingness to impinge on
the province of the jury as finders of fact. Where the circumstance
creating the possibility of prejudice is inherent in the procedure,
an appellate court would seem to be faced with the dilemma of ig-
noring the possible prejudice or overturning the entire procedure.
When Pennsylvania courts have been faced with appeals challeng-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence of corpus delicti, the response
in some cases has been to ignore the question of whether the in-
dependent evidence alone was sufficient for the jury's determina-
tion. These courts review the sufficiency of the evidence for ad-
mission of the confession and then review the sufficiency of all
the evidence, the confession and any additional evidence, in sup-
port of a guilty verdict.96
That the Pennsylvania courts do not demand adherence to this
very strict standard of proof is suggested by several appellate de-
cisions. In Commonwealth v. Coontz, affirming the defendant's
homicide conviction, the court stated, "When testimony points to
an unlawful killing, though it may also indicate accident or sui-
cide, statements of the accused then become admissible to show
there was an unlawful slaying. . .. "97 In Commonwealth v. Mar-
shall, again affirming a homicide conviction, the court said,
Considerable evidence was presented in support of the the-
ory of accidental death. . . . This evidence, along with the
94. Morgan, supra note 83, at 189.
95. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944).
96. See Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940).
97. Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 79, 135 A. 538, 539 (1926).
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confession of the defendant that he had choked his victim,
was passed on by the jurors who, by their verdict, very
properly refused to accept the theory that deceased had
died from an accidental cause.
98
In Commonwealth v. Dyell, affirming the trial court's ruling to
sustain the defendant's demurrer to the evidence, the court held
that the Commonwealth had failed to provide "clear proof of a
criminal death." 90  Here, the evidence consisted of testimony as
to the finding of the skeleton of the victim in an isolated woods
covered by branches and the defendant's false denial that he knew
nothing about the body; medical evidence was unable to establish
the cause of death. The only other evidence was the defendant's
statement that he had been with the victim and that, in running
away from him, she must have fallen; he admitted finding her
body and hiding it. The court distinguishes this case from others
cited earlier on the basis of the absence of a confession: "In no
case where both clear proof of a criminal death and a confession,
or incriminating admissions, were lacking was the Commonwealth's
case ruled sufficient." 10 0 The court here seems to forget that the
existence of a confession is supposed to have no effect on the bur-
den of proving a criminal death.
When the appellate courts do discuss the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of corpus delicti in a particular case, the result seems to be
more an attempt to justify a verdict than to review it. In Com-
monwealth v. Homeyer, the court provides an extensive list of
Suspicious acts, including false statements, flight, fear, and mani-
festations of mental distress, from which the defendant's guilt can
be inferred,10 1 from which inference the fact of some crime can be
inferred, from which inference the fact of the crime charged can
be inferred. By application of this reasoning, evidence of the de-
fendant's conflicting statements to others was held to constitute
evidence of the corpus delicti; 0 2 disposing of a body was held to
constitute evidence of a murder; 03 the defendant's forging his
98. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 519, 135 A. 301, 303 (1926).
99. 399 Pa. 563, 569, 160 A.2d 448, 450 (1960).
100. Id. at 569, 160 A.2d at 450. But cf. Commonwealth v. Homeyer,
373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953); Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326, 146
A. 905 (1929).
101. 373 Pa. 150, 158, 92 A.2d 743, 744 (1953). Id. at 158, 159, 92 A.2d
at 744.
102. Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953); Com-
monwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 A. 657 (1926).
103. Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 297 Pa. 326, 146 A. 905 (1929); Commonwealth v.
Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301 (1926).
wife's name to withdraw money from her savings account prior to
her death was held to constitute evidence of her murder; 10 4 in-
consistency of statements to the police was held to constitute evi-
dence of the corpus delicti;105 attempts to "divert suspicion" were
held evidence of the fact of a murder.10 6 Such reasoning is spe-
cious logic and questionable policy. "The corpus delicti cannot
be based on an inference. ' 10 7 Since the purpose of the require-
ment that corpus delicti be independently proven is to avoid con-
victing for a "crime" the only proof of which is a defendant's
confession, to base a finding that the crime was committed on
other "guilty behavior" of the defendant would seem to subvert
the purpose of the requirement. As has been noted by courts in
other jurisdictions, suspicious behavior may point to possible guilt
of some offense but is not evidence of any particular offense. 0
Disposing of a body may show guilty knowledge but is no evi-
dence of an unlawful death;10 9 the defendant's having forged let-
ters purporting to have been written by the alleged victim is not
evidence that a murder was committed." 0
The disposition of corpus questions by the appellate courts
suggests the difficulties and inconsistencies inherent in the Penn-
sylvania corpus delicti rule as it is enunciated. The rule as stated
would impose, in some cases, a nearly impossible burden on prose-
cutors, but the impossibility of meeting it is effectively eliminated
by the equally impossible task imposed on the jury. It is question-
able, however, whether this method of arriving at a workable cor-
pus requirement is either acceptable or effective.
VI. CONCLUSION
Underlying any corpus rule are the policies of avoiding con-
victions based on confessions either coerced or motivated by some
pathological disposition and discouraging investigators from rely-
ing for convictions on naked extra-judicial confessions. At one
time, a very strict corpus requirement may have been not only
justified but necessary. At its inception, when confessions were
often not strictly voluntary and defendants could regularly be
executed upon conviction for any number of crimes, discovery that
a crime had never been committed could easily come too late for
any apologies to be made to the convicted criminal. Although the
basic policy discouraging a conviction based solely on a confession
104. Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 92 A.2d 743 (1953).
105. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301 (1926).
106. Commonwealth v. Letrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943).
107. People v. Zwierowski, 368 Mich. 56, 60, 117 N.W.2d 179, 181 (1962).
Accord People v. Folsom, 268 App. Div. 350, 51 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1944).
108. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937). See State v.
Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353.
109. State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010 (Utah, 1938).
110. Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949).
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would seem to justify some requirement of independent evi-
dence, circumstances today would not seem to warrant a very
strict requirement. The problem of coerced confessions is sepa-
rately dealt with by the law on voluntariness, and increased so-
phistication on the part of both investigators and jurors as to the
psychological motivations possibly underlying a confession proba-
bly help mitigate some of the problems of pathological confessions.
The corpus requirement that Pennsylvania seems to have, in
practice, requires some evidence outside the confession tending to
establish corpus delicti. The jury, in actuality, probably cannot
help but make its determination on both corpus delicti and the de-
fendant's guilt considering all the evidence presented. The Penn-
sylvania practice, much in keeping with the rule in the majority of
jurisdictions, would seem to further the valid policies of the re-
quirement without imposing senselessly restrictive burdens on
the prosecution. It is questionable, however, whether the best way
to reach the result is through this confusing complex of contradic-
tory rules and mitigating interpretations, through this morass of
preliminary determinations, varying sufficiency requirements, lim-
iting instructions and appellate justifications.
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